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Abstract
The Maastricht Treaty has augmented the preconditions that have to be fulfilled by
ED applicants before a full membership can be achieved. Candidates have to prove
that a participation in the European Monetary Union is a realistic possibility at least
in the medium term. This paper explores the difficulties of the Visegnid countries
to fulfill this monetary precondition. Apart from the convergence criteria, the
cyclical correlation both within Central Europa and between Central and Western
Europe is analysed. Based on that evidence, an early membership in the European
Monetary System is proposed as an element of a promising EU membership strate-
gy. Besides that, the potential role of a stabilization fund is discussed that could
cushion asymmetric shocks hitting the Visegnid countries.
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After a difficult period the train towards monetary union seems to be on a stable
track again. In November 1993 the Maastricht Treaty went into effect and the
European Union (EU) was created. The Treaty precisely defines the way to the
introduction of a European currency at the latest by the end of the decade. The
transition to the second stage ofthe Economic and Monetary Union in January 1994
has led to the setting up of the European Monetary Institute that is responsible for
preparing the introduction of the ECU as a common currency. Even if many policy-
makers and a large part of the European population do not seem to believe in the
final realization of the project, an automatism has been started that - with a high
probability - will result in the introduction of a European currency.
The momentum of monetary integration in Western Europe could aggravate
the problems for the Central European reform countries to get access to the EU. The
options for full membership for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic, Rumania and Bulgaria are clearly stated in the Europe Agreements. In
April 1994 Poland and Hungary have officially applied for EU membership. Howe-
ver, there are serious barriers on the way to full membership.
These barriers do not result exclusively from the different economic and
social structure between West and Central Europe. On the contrary, at least as
serious are the obstacles resulting from an inadequate institutional structure of the
European Union. In its present shape, this structure is not appropriate for managing
a community of 20 or more member states. The expected extension of the EU to the
North (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria) in 1995 will increase the pressure for
reforming the political institutions and decision mechanisms. In this regard reforms
can be expected that will make a further EU extension easier.
On the budgetary field, the North extension will not lead to any reform
pressure that could pave the way for Central Europe. Austria and the Scandinavian
countries will pay more into the EU budget than they can expect to receive from
agricultural and structural policy. So the extension will rather alleviate the budgetary
problems of the EU than intensifying the need for reforms.
In contrast to that, an East extension seems to pose insurmountable budgetary
difficulties (CEPR, 1992). The relatively low income in the Central European
countries would - according to the existing EU rules - lead to substantial receipts
from the structural funds and a low contribution from these countries into Brussels'
budget. Therefore, a CEPR report comes to the conclusion: "budgetary reasons makeit very unlikely that any CEEC will be admitted in the foreseeable future" (CEPR?
1992, p. 58). Of course, this conclusion holds only true if the existing rules are
applied to new member countries from Central Europe. Two solutions are possible.
Either the budgetary rules are changed for the whole EU or there will be a differen-
tial treatment ofthe newcomers. The first solution seems to be politically unfeasable
as it would be rejected by the traditional net recipients among EU member states.
Only the differential treatment of the Central European states and a less ambitious
structural funding there seems to make an early EU membership possible.
Even if these predominantly political problems could be overcome, the
monetary ambitions of the EU have now added to the difficulties. With the Maa-
stricht Treaty a new precondition for membership is the ability to enter the train
towards a single currency. Under these circumstances, only those countries can be
admitted to the EU for which membership in the monetary union is a realistic
possibility within the foreseeable future. Because the introduction of a single money
is not without risks that probably increase with the size and diversity ofthe currency
area, new applicants will be assessed very cautiously.' Membership can only be
realized if the West can be convinced there will be no negative effects on the
quality of the single European currency. As a consequence, for a successful EU
membership strategy today the monetary perspective must be taken into account
much more seriously than before the Maastricht Treaty.
This paper is to provide some ideas to that monetary perspective. It starts by
looking at the situation of the Visegnid countries in the light of the Maastricht
criteria (section 2). After that some results from optimum currency empirics are
presented (section 3). In the succeeding section 4 the potential role of the EMS as
an intermediate form of monetary integration before full EU membership is discus-
sed. Finally a stabilization fund is proposed that could at low costs provide a
substantial help for a successful EMS membership and the further monetary integra-
tion of Central Europe (section 5).
2. The Convergence Criteria
A sufficient extent of economic convergence is necessary for forming a succesfull
monetary union. The Maastricht Treaty has defined criteria and critical values in





A candidate must not have an inflation rate (measured by
the consumer price index) which exceeds the average
figure of the three countries with the lowest inflation rate
by more than 1.5 per cent.
The public deficit (all federal levels plus the systems of
social security) must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and
the accumulated public debt must not exceed 60 per cent
of GDP. Instead of that, it may be sufficient if these indi-
cators are declining fast enough.
In the preceeding two years the exchange rate of the can-
didate must have evolved without "strong tensions" within
the normal fluctuation bands of the Exchange Rate Me-
chanism. Furthermore the bilateral parities of the ERM
must not have been changed unilaterally by a candidate.
Thelong-run nominal interest rate of a candidate must not
exceed the interest rate of the three countries with the
lowest inflation rate by more than two per cent.
The criteria are not binding, they have merely to be "appropriately taken into consi-
deration" (Art. 109j(3)). However, it can be expected that these criteria will play an
important role. The German constitutional court has emphasized their relevance in
its decision of October 1993 on the Maastricht Treaty. The court's judgement has
given Germany a kind of opt-out possibility on constitutional grounds in the event
that the European partners will try to force Germany into a monetary union against
a parliamentary majority. If one supposes that Germany (Le. the Bundestag) will
stick to a strict interpretation of the criteria as declared by both major parties, this
emphasizes the criteria's relevance.
Especially the fiscal criteria are open for criticism on economic grounds.
While some authors deny the necessity of any debt limits (Buiter, Corsetti and
Roubini, 1993), others (Heinemann, 1993) do not criticize so much the necessity but
rather the actual form of the debt limits. There is the danger that with an insolvent
country the Community could be forced to bail-out this country in order to prevent
damage on the financial system. Although the Treaty contains an explicit no-bail-
3out-clause (Art. I04b), this clause could lack credibility. An appropriate debt limit
should therefore avoid an unsustainable accumulation of national debt. The level of
"sustainable" debt, however, depends on the individual characteristics of an econo-
my, i.e. the real growth rate, the real interest rate or the supply of capital. For the
economies in transition for example, where capital markets are not yet fully develo-
ped, a 60-per cent public debt level would be more serious than for an economy
with a rich capital supply from domestic savings.
The other criteria are less controversial. Exchange rate stability over a certain
period is a proof that an economy is able to do the necessary economic adjustment
without adjusting its nominal exchange rate.
A low rate of inflation of a candidate is essential for the confidence into the
price stability ofthe European monetary union. Although the statute ofthe European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) resembles in many regards the German Bundes-
bank, some risks concerning the actual degree of central bank independence remain
(Kenen, 1992, p. 51; Neuman, 1992). Exchange rate policy is not under control of
the ESCB. The personal independence of the heads of the national central banks is
not convincingly protected. Because of these institutional shortcomings it is impor-
tant that potential members of the monetary union prove their preference for price
stability by a history of low inflation rates.
Convergence of long run interest rates is inherently connected to the inflation
and exchange rate criteria. If markets are convinced that exchange rate stability is
permanent because of a lasting convergence of inflation rates, interest rate conver-
gence will follow.
How do the" Visegnid countries perform today in the light of two central
Maastricht criteria, i.e. deficit ratios and inflation rates? Table I and 2 present some
of the relevant data. In the light of the deficit criterium the Visegnid countries do
not perform any worse than the West. In 1993 the average deficit ratio of the public
sector in the EU-12 countries is 6 per cent (European Commission, 1994, table 62).
On the contrary, in 1993 apart from Luxemburg no other EU country had such a
favourable budgetary position as the Czech Republic.
On the monetary field the Visegrad countries still perform significantly worse
than Western Europe. The EU economies have proceeded far on the way towards
inflationary convergence on a low level (average CPI inflation in the EU economies
1993 is 3.9 per cent, European Commission, 1994, table 27). The reform states are
still clearly above this average inflation rate level. From the point of view of opti-
mum taxation the inflationary performance of the reform countries might be effi-
4cient. It could be the case that in the reform process collecting seigniorage is
associated with less distortions for the economic process than additional taxation.
However, only with a further reduction in the coming years well into the single digit
region, the reform states could be seen as serious candidates for European monetary
integration. The fear is large that a high rate of inflation in the Central and Eastern
European countries is a sign for underlying structural deficiencies, such as an
inefficient tax system, excessive public expenditures or an immature capital market
(CEPR, 1992, p. 92) and that these deficiencies would lead to inflationary pressure
in a European monetary union including these countries.
The further process ofinflation reduction will not be easy. The GECD (l994a,
p. 134) expects the further reduction ofthe inflationary trend to be more slowly than
in the past. An ade"quate monetary strategy should imply an approach to assist
further inflation reduction.
Table 1: Inflation
(Percentage Change CPI over Pre~ious Year)
1992 1993 1994 1995
Czech Republic 11 21 11 10
Hungary 23 22 19 17
Poland 43 37 30 25
Slovak Republic 10 23 16 15
Table 2: General Government Deficits
(Percentage of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2,0
Hungary -7.0 -6.0 -8 -6
Poland -6.0 -2,8 -4 -4
Slovak Republic . -3.0 -6.8 -5 -5
Source: OECD (l994a)
53. Optimum Currency Area Empirics
3.1. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
Although the Maastricht criteria have to be taken seriously because they will be
central within the political qualification process, additional infonnation can be
sought from the theory of optimum currency areas (TOCA) and its empirical
application. The criteria do not tell whether a monetary union is an advisable project
for those countries that fulfill the criteria. The TOCA methodology can be used to
analyze whether, apart from the political arguments for an EMU participation of the
refonn countries, there is an economic case for it. It is the merit of the TOCA (the
seminal paper is Mundell, 1961) to have led away from the generalizing debate
about fixed versus flexible exchange rates. This debate used to argue for or against-
fixed exchange rates without taking into account the individual characteristics of
different countries. Instead of this, TOeA tries to identify indicators which give
information about the chance that a given group of countries will be able to form a
successful currency union.
The basic concept of TOCA is cost-benefit-analysis. If a group of countries
decides to give up the instrument of an adjustable nominal exchange rate this step
leads first of all to saved transaction costs. Resources which are used in the whole
process of managing foreign exchanges in the private and the enterprise sector can
be used otherwise. It is estimated that for EMU these savings will amount to 0.3-0.4
per cent of the European GDP (Commission of the European Communities, 1990).
If previously there was excess volatility of the nominal exchange rate between the
countries considering monetary union there is another benefit by wiping out this
burden for trade among those countries.
There are costs in giving up an adjustable exchange rate, which could exceed
the moderate benefits from lower transaction costs by far. The exchange rate can be
a helpful adjustment instrument between countries which are hit by asymmetric de-
mand or supply shocks. An adjustable nominal exchange rate will be of particular
importance ifit can change international relative prices with a higher speed than this
could be done by a reaction of prices and wages. Therefore, asymmetric shocks
combined with wage and price rigidities strongly suggest the usefulness of an
adjustable exchange rate in order to'avoid internal (i.e. unemployment) and external
(unsustainable current account deficits) disequilibria. However, there could be
alternative adjustment instruments which may offer a substitute for an adjustable
6exchange rate. In his classical paper Mundell (1961) focuses in this context on
labour mobility: "Regions". between which labour mobility is perfect. can form a
monetary union even with price rigidities and the occurence of asymmetric distur-
bances. In this case migration will do the job of avoiding unemployment. Other
alternative adjustment instruments have been discussed: Ingram (1959) discusses the
importance of capital mobility. Kenen (1969) mentions the stabilizing function of
fiscal integration: fiscal mechanisms ofinterregional distribution can help to allevia-
te the consequences of shocks with asymmetric regional impact.
Figure 1: The TOCA Concept
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monetary union!Figure 1 serves'to summarize these ideas. If two countries think about forming a
currency union they should pose the following questions:
First, are the shocks, which hit both economies, of a symmetric nature? Ifnot
there could be a problem in giving up an adjustable nominal exchange rate.
Second, are the reasons for asymmetry expected to disappear? If the real
integration of both economies is to progress, an increasing symmetry of
disturbances can be expected. In our context it might be that the specific
adjustment problems which characterize the transformation process are re-
sponsable for asymmetry; in this case there will be more symmetry when the
transfonnation process is completed.
Third, are there alternative adjustment instruments which could the job do as
well as or even better than an adjustable nominal exchange rate? The most
important adjustment mechanism in a market economy is the flexibility of
prices on all markets for goods and labour. If there are substantial rigidities
even an adjustable nominal exchange rate cannot solve all problems since the
nominal exchange rate can only change relative price between two currency
areas and can not achieve all the changes ofrelative prices which are necessa-
ry in a dynamic economy (Melitz, 1991). Other possible alternatives include
besides capital and labour mobility the instrument of fiscal integration.
The empirical focus of this study will be on question 1, i.e. the degree of cyclical
symmetry among European economies. As an alternative adjustment instrument a
specific kind of fiscal integration is suggested in section 5.
3.2. Data and Methodology
In a couple of studies the degree of cyclical symmetry in Western Europe has been
analyzed (CEPR, 1992; Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989; Bayoumi and Eichengreen,
1992). The CEPR study and the analysis by Bayoumi and Eichengreen both come
to the conclusion that within Western Europe there is a core-periphery-pattern
among Western European economies. A core of countries show a high degree of
cyclical correlation while there are economies in the periphery with an asynchronous
8business cycle relative to that core. It will be interesting to regard the Visegrad
countries within that context.
For this analysis, consistent data for an indicator of the business cycle for
both West and Central European economies are necessary. For that purpose, it was
possible to collect monthly data for an index of industrial production for the EU,
EFTA (without Switzerland) and Visegrad countries. The source for the EU and
EFTA economies are the IMF International Financial Statistics, the data are general-
ly available from the beginning of 1972 (for exceptions see appendix). For the
Visegnid economies, monthly index of industrial production data could be obtained
from the GECD Short-Term Economic Indicators starting in the beginning of 1980
(exception is Poland where data start in 1985, see appendix). The GECD data base
has the special advantage that it offers separate Czech and Slovak data. Therefore,
in the analysis it was possible to treat the Czech and Slovak Republic as ,separate
economies from the starting point of data in 1980.
Since seasonal effects have to be eliminated before performing a trend-cycle-
decomposition, seasonally adjusted time series are used for the analysis. GECD
Visegrad data from t~e 1980s do not in every case conform to the conventions that
can be relied upon when working with similar data for developed market economies
(GEeD, I994b). A problem of a volume indicator as it is used here is that in
socialist times it was derived by dividing value data by possibly distorted price
indices. For example, under-stated prices lead to an over-statement of volume. Ex
post adjustment for such a mismeasurement is not possible because no quantification
of the distortion is available. This quality limitation has to be kept in mind in the
analysis of data from the period before the introduction of a market-oriented price
system.
The methodological problem ofa business cycle analysis is the decomposition
of the relevant time series into a permanent and a cyclical component. Popular ways
of detrending include the calculation of a moving average or the regression on time.
The latter approach was criticized by Nelson and Plosser (1982). They found out
that for many macroecoQomic time series which are difference stationary this
approach leads to a misspecification. With difference stationary time series, a
decomposition technique as proposed by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) is more
adequate.
Following Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), a pragmatic approach is applied here.
Detrending the data set by the Beveridge-Nelson-procedure leads to very implausible
results contradicting strongly the core-periphery-pattern in Western Europe as found
9in the studies cited above. Conventional decomposition methods (moving average
and regression on time) produce results more in line with these studies. Because of
this plausibility test, the analysis is based on a conventional decomposition. In the
following, the cyclical component is calculated as the deviation from a 36-months-
moving-average. The analysis was also performed by regressing the series on a
second-order-polynomial in time. The results are qualitatively similar and are not
presented.
After calculating the cyclical component of the index of industrial production
as the deviation from a 36-months-moving-average, correlation coefficients as a
measure of cyclical closeness between European economies can be derived. In
addition, it is interesting to compare the extent ofcyclical fluctuations between West
and Central Europe as measured by the standard deviation of the cyclical compo-
nent. Even ifeconomies are hit by shocks at the same time, there is a problem if the
size of the disturbance is different. In a monetary union there is one common
monetary policy which might appropriately be used as an instrument against homo-
genous disturbances that have similar effects everywhere. If the shock, although it
is symmetric, leads to fluctuations of income of a very different size, a single
monetary policy can not be tailored according to the national needs. If monetary
policy reacts on the average size of the fluctuation this leads to an excessive mone-
tary stance in those countries where the shock has a lower than average effect and
vice versa in those where the shock has a higher than average effect (CEPR, 1992,
p.44).
3.3. The Western Perspective
For a successful European monetary union, it is helpful if potential members of the
common currency area have a high degree of cyclical correlation. For the analysis
it seems appropriate to take GermanY as the reference economy. A monetary union
without Germany does not make much sense both on economic and on political
grounds. Benefits from saved transaction costs would be small excluding the largest
European economy. More important is a political consideration: A central motivation
for the drive towards monetary union is the desire of,France and other states to
break the dominance ofthe Bundesbank for monetary policy in Europe (De Grauwe,
1993). Therefore, monetary union without Germany would be pointless.
The following tables present the ED-20-economies (ED members, member
10candidates of EFTA and the Visegrad countries) ordered by the cylical closeness
towards Gennany as measured by the coefficient of correlation. The standard
deviation ofthe cyclical component relative to the Gennan standard deviation serves
to compare the extent of fluctuations.
For the construction of table 3 all available data were included, i.e. starting
for most EU and EFfA states in 1972 and for the Central European states in the 80s
(see appendix). These results - not surprisingly - identify a core of economies
around Gennany: France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, of which Austria
and Belgium do not only appear cyclically close to Gennany but have also a similar
order ofmagnitude ofcyclical fluctuation. From this analysis, these economies seem
to be ideal candidates for fonning a monetary union.
The EFTA economies together with the UK, Ireland, Greece and Portugal
appear more distant from the core. The position of the Czech and Slovak Republic
is within that EFTA field, while Hungary and Poland show a clearly negative
correlation to the Gennan cycle. All four Visegrad economies are characterized by
a standard deviation of the cyclical component that is above the average of Western
Europe.
In addition to regarding the whole period since the 1970s, subperiods are
analysed. This seems of particular interest taking into account the structural break
in Central Europe with the start of the transition process. It is important to see
whether after the beginning of refonns and the opening of the Central European
economies to the West their cyclical fluctuations become more related to the Euro-
pean core. The following both tables present the results separately for the 80s and
the 90s. The calculations for the 90s generally include data until about the end of
1993 (see appendix).
Comparing the 80s and the early 90s leads to following conclusions for EU
and EFfA states: The cyclical core is quite stable in both periods. Particularly in the
90s. Italy and Spain seem to belong to that core. In the 90s, EFfA countries have
a cycle negatively correlated to the core.
The bottom ranking of the Visegrad countries in the 80s reflects the isolation
of Central Europe from Western Europe and the world economy in the socialist past.
It is not surprising that fluctuations in industrial production in that time do not
parallel the Gernlan cyle. What is more surprising is the fact that the standard
deviation of the cylical ~omponent in the old system is not significantly below
Western European levels. Judging from the index of industrial production there
seemed to be something similar to a business cycle in socialist times as well. In the
IIyears since 1990 Poland and Hungary are still far away from the Western cyle. This
result is plausible since this period has been a time of adjustment with strongly
falling incomes and production in the reform countries while Germany on the other
hand experienced the "unification boom". With this background the medium ranking
of the Czech and Slovak Republics seems to be remarkable. Nevertheless, this
analysis indicates that an early monetary union including the Visegrad countries
would pose serious problems because of incomplete real integration. Even if a
country such as the Czech Republic managed to keep the exchange rate to European
currencies ,relatively stable, the asynchronous cyclical performance hints on pro-
blems at the latest when restrictions on the capital account are given up.
Table 3: EU-20 Cyclical Correlation with Germany
(All Data, See Appendix)
Rank Country Correlation Standard Deviation
Coefficient Relative to Gennanv
1 France 078 o6X
2 Austria 073 096
3 BelQ'ium 069 095
4 Netherlands 067 078
5 LuxemburQ' 059 179
6 Denmark 057 165
7 Soain 054 083
8 Italv 051 1 26
9 United Kin{!dom 039 095
10 Norwav 028 1 18
11 Slovak Renublic 024 238
12 Greece 021 1 12
13 Czech Renublic ,015 261
14 Ireland 010 1 57
15 Sweden 006 1 11
16 Finland 004 110
17 Portu{!al -004 198
18 Hum!arv -021 1 86
19 Poland -0,53 3,06
12Table 4: EU-20 Cyclical Correlation with Germany, The 80s
(See Appendix)
Rank Country Correlation Standard Deviation
Coefficient Relative to Germany
1 Austria 0,77 0,96
2 France 0,74 0,67
3 Denmark 0,73 2,10
4 Italy 0,68 1,38
5 Luxemburg 0,67 2,03
6 Belgium 0,66 1,07
7 Netherlands 0,65 0,98
8 Norway 0,62 1,84
9 Spain 0,62 0,90
10 Greece 0,56 1,23
II United Kingdom 0,53 1,23
12 Sweden 0,53 1,07
13 Portugal 0,30 2,28
14 Finland 0,29 0,91
15 Ireland 0,28 2,17
16 Czech Republic 0,06 0,83
I7 Slovak Republic 0,06 1,67
18 Hungary -0,32 1,06
19 Poland -0,54 2,00
13Table 5: EU-20 Cyclical Correlation with Germany - the 90s
(See Appendix)
Rank Country Correlation Standard Deviation
Coefficient Relative to Gennany
I Austria· 0,89 0,<,)0
2 France 0,85 0,45
3 Spain 0,76 0,70
4 Belgium 0,73 0,82
5 - Italy 0,66 0,4<,)
6 Netherlands 0,64 0,63
7 Luxemburg 0,53 0,77
8 Denmark 0,39 0,52
9 Slovak Republic 0,30 1,77
10 Czech Republic 0,15 1,74
11 Ireland 0,09 0,72
12 Portugal 0,08 1,02
13 Greece -0,00 0,68
14 Sweden -0,13 0,75
15 United Kingdom -0,21 0,42
16 Finland -0,34 0,90
17 Norway -0,35 0,62
18 Hungary -0,51 I,II
19 Poland -0,90 1,95
143.4. Regional Currency Integration in Central Europe?
From the cyclical analysis, the Visegnid countries do not yet appear to be ripe to
enter a monetary union together with the EU core. For the medium-term monetary
strategy, regional forms of exchange-rate cooperation could be imagined. Such a
monetary strategy would parallel recent attempts for a regional trade policy. In April
1994, it was agreed to accelerate the speed towards the completion of the Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). Until 1998 all tariffs on industrial products are
to be abolished for the internal trade among these countries. Possibly some kind of
exchange-rate cooperation could accompany this process of integration. What does
the cyclical analysis tell about the chances of some form of Visegrad exchange-rate
cooperation, such as a monetary union in Central Europe? To answer that questio~,
as a point of reference the Czech economy is chosen. This seems to be justified by
the fact that the exchange rate stability and the relatively low inflation rate qualify
the Czech Republic as a fixpoint for a possible Central European exchange rate
system.
In the following two tables the same kind of analysis as in the preceding
section is presented, separately for the 80s and 90s, this time from the point of view
of the Czech Republic. For the relation between Central and Western Europe the
results simply mirror the preceding analysis but offer new insights into the internal
relations within Central Europe.
In the 80s, the Visegnid countries show a certain degree of cyclical paralle-
lism. However, the correlation coefficient does not reach levels as can be found
among the Western European core economies. The relatively low correlation bet-
ween industrial production in the Czech and Slovak Republic in times of a united
country is surprising and may offer some explanation for the fast dissolution of
monetary union between both Republics after the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993.
In the 90s, the low correlation between the Czech Republic and Poland is
striking. Correlation with Hungary and the Slovak Republic is clearly positive.
However, the Czech cycl,e appears to be equally correlated to some EU and EFTA
countries (UK, Finland and Sweden) that are positioned in the European peIiphery
judging from the analysis of the last section.
These results do not lead to a recommendation in favour of a regional system
of monetary unification in Central Europe. In the time since the beginning of the
reforms there have been no hints on an individual Visegrad cycle that would be an
argument for a regional currency unification strategy.
15Table 6: EU-20 Cyclical Correlation with the Czech Republic - the 80s
(See Appendix)
Rank Country Correlation Standard Devia-
Coefficient tion Relative to
Czech Republic
I Hungary 0,52 1.2X
2 Poland OAo 2A3
3 Belgium 0,42 1,30
4 Slovak Republic 0.28 2,10
5 Greece 0,25 1.40
6 France O.! () (U';I
7 Finland 0,10 1.11
8 Denmark 0,10 2.55
9 Spain 0,07 LOt)
1O Gennany 0,06 1.21
II Portugal 0,04 2,77
12 United Kingdom -CUl2 1.40
13 Luxemburg -U,03 2,47
14 Italy -(J,U5 1,67
15 Sweden -(),07 1,30
16 Norway -0,08 2,23
17 Netherlands \-0,13 I,ll)
18 Austria -0,22 L17
19 Ireland -fl,3l 2,63
16Table 7: EU-20 Cyclical Correlation with the Czech Republic - the 90s
(See Appendix)
Rank Country Correla- Standard Deviation
tion Coef- Relative to the
ficient Czech Republic
1 United Kingdom 0,69 0,24
2 Finland 0,68 0,52
3 Hungary 0,64 0,64
4 Sweden 0,62 0,43
5 Portugal 0,53 0,58
6 Belgium 0,53 0,47
7 Italy 0,53 0,28
n
X Slovak Republic 0,51 1,02
lJ Luxemburg 0,47 0,44
10 Ireland 0,44 0,41
II Austria 0,38 0,52
12 France 0,31 0,26
13 Norway 0,27 0,36
14 Spain 0,26 0,40
15 Germany 0,15 0,58
16 Netherlands 0.12 0,36
17 Greece 0.05 0,39
IX Poland -ll.O4 LI2
IlJ Denmark -0,13 fun
174. Early EMS-Membership?
4.1. Tying One's Hands
The analysis has identified two problems, that have to be overcome before a mem-
bership of Central European states in the European Monetary Union can be imagi-
ned. Firstly, a further reduction of the inflation rate is essential but not an easy task.
Secondly, the degree of integration - as measured by the cyclical correlation - has
to be increased.It can be expected that time will work for the solution of the second
problem. Once the adjustment process has come to an end and the restructuring of
the economies has been completed, the growing volume of trade will produce a
narrower relation between Central and Western European cycles. However, in the
meantime the fact ofan existing cyclical distance has to be taken into account when
thinking about a monetary strategy. Therefore, the monetary strategy should on the
one hand be helpful in overcoming the inflation problem and on the other hand
maintain the possibility of exchange rate changes as an adjustment instrument.
In Western Europe, the European Monetary System (EMS) has been an
instrument for the participating economies to import monetary credibility from the
German Bundesbank and for "tying one's hands" (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988).
Breaking inflationary expectations can lead to high costs such as mounting un-
employment. These costs can be reduced if market participants get convinced that
there is a change of the monetary regime towards a more restrictive policy. In
Western Europe, the EMS membership has served that purpose for countries with a
high inflation tradition.
In the EMS, exchange-nite targets are defined in form of central rates and a
fluctuation margin around that rate. The system is formally constructed in a sym-
metric way, i.e. the central banks of both the strong and the weak currency have to
intervene if their bilateral rate reaches the intervention point. Practically, it has
worked in an asymmetric way and allowed the German Bundesbank to dominate the
system. Countries that were not willing or able to follow the German monetary
policy had to devalue. This was often the case in the early stage of the EMS bet-
ween 1979 and 1983 and again in the course of the EMS crisis of 1992/1993. The
EMS is used as an explanation for the success ofantiinflation-policy in traditionally
high inflation economies.
France as an example after a series of devaluations committed itself in 1983
to a policy of the "Franc Fort" within the EMS framework. By this commitment it
18raised the political costs of a lax monetary policy since this would have resulted in
pressure on the exchange rate. When France entered the EMS, its inflation rate was
above 10 per cent. 1994 the French inflation rate is estimated to be around 2 per
cent, the lowest rate in the ED - an indication that the EMS was helpful to increase
monetary credibility in ED member states and to realize monetary convergence in
Europe.
This experience hints on possible advantages of an early EMS membership of
the Central European reform countries, particularly for the further process of in-
flation reduction. Again, the EMS could export monetary credibility into economies
that face the difficult task of breaking inflationary expectations. On the other hand,
the EMS with its fluctuation band and the possibility of realignments offers the
flexibility that is necessary taking into account the still imcomplete real integration
between Central and Western Europe.
4.2. Western Fears
Several authors have discussed an early EMS membership of the reform countries.
Generally, there is the fear that a premature membership in the monetary institutions
of the industrialized countries could damage the quality ofthese institutions (Portes,
1994). More specifically, in the context of the EMS there could be the danger of an
inflationary impact of early membership on the whole European currency area
(Bofinger, 1991; CEPR, 1992 and Frohlich, 1992). This inflationary danger could
result from the EMS intervention obligations. With full membership the Visegnid
central banks would have access to unlimited credit from the "Very Short-term
Financing Facility" of the EMS. This facility provides the weak currencies at the
lower intervention point with central bank deposits denominated in the strong
currency. There is a disciplining element within the EMS rules since a central bank
has to repay all inte,rvention credits after a certain period. Nevertheless, there is the
fear that with a limited credibility of the chosen central rate, the necessary massive
interventions would have a liquidity impact on the hard currency monetary ag-
gregate. In the worst case the central bank of the strong currency would lose the
effective control over the monetary supply.
The experience of German dominance in the EMS seems to be a counter-
argument against these fears. This experience has demonstrated that the stability of
the strong currency is not necessarily negatively influenced by a loose monetary
19policy in the other member countries. Bofinger (1991), however, doubts whether this
experience is valid for an EMS including the transition economies. There is a
serious problem if central banks in transition economies do not have an effective
control of the asset side of their balance sheet. This would be the case if they are
urged to an unlimited financing of government and enterprise deficits.
4.3. The Situation after the EMS Crisis
The EMS crisis between September 1992 and August 1993 has changed the charac-
ter of the EMS. These changes seem to be very relevant for the question of an early
EMS membership of the Visegnid countries.
Between 1987 and 1992 there were no realignments of central EMS parities.
This success was- attributed to a growing degree ofconvergence in Europe. With the
Maastricht Treaty that was signed in February 1992, the EMS stability seemed to
get a further base by the prospect of monetary union. More and more, the EMS was
regarded as a de facto monetary union that would smoothly be replaced by a single
currency. In June 1992, Denmark voted against the Maastricht Treaty and the
confidence into the success of monetary integration was seriously shaken. In Sep-
tember the pressure from foreign exchange markets urged Lira and Pound to leave
the Exchange Rate Mechanism and to start floating. The speculative pressure on the
other currencies against the DM continued. Realignments in November 1992,
February and May 1993 failed to bring back the old stability. In August 1993, the
old fluctuation bands (+/- 2,25 per cent) were replaced by bands of +/- 15 per cent.
Today the EMS can be characterized as a system of unilateral exchange rate targe-
ting because of its wide fluctuation margins (Neumann, 1994).
The analysis of the EMS crisis has so far produced some insights into its
causes (Lesch, 1994). Ex post, the long period of exchange-rate stability seems to
have been artificial from the point of view ofeconomic fundamentals. In particular,
the German unification may have caused adjustment pressure on real exchange rates.
With the eruption of that pressure in the EMS crisis, the overshooting speculation
led to pressure even on currencies such as the French Franc or the Danish Crown
that did not seem fundamentally justified.
The EMS crisis has started a reform discussion how to improve the system.
A couple of reform suggestions recommend measures to limitate speculative' activity
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993). Neumann (1994) suggests to advance exchange-
20rate stability by a fast introduction of complete central bank independence in order
to make monetary convergence of EMS countries more credible. Until today no
institutional consequences were drawn apart from the introduction of the wide
fluctuation margins. However, there is a growing consensus (Lesch, 1994) that the
EMS should not be understood as an early monetary union. In order to avoid
speculative pressure in future, early realignments should be carried out in case of
fundamental divergence.
This less ambitious view of the EMS after the crisis makes the system more
adequate for an early membership of the Visegnld countries. The advantages of the
"new" EMS from that perspective are:
The wider flucuation margins: These margins offer enough room for exchan-
ge-rate adjustments that may be necessary because of the incomplete real
integration between Central and Western Europe.
Increased readiness to realign central rates: In case that the 30-per-cent-band
does not give enough room for the necessary adjustment, a realignment can
help. This would not be a political problem in the new EMS as it was before
when the de facto monetary union was at stake.
More effective sanctions: Because of both the wider margins and the increa-
sed readiness to realign, the system has more effective sanctions. It is clear
again that a country with a high inflation will not be able to count on the
unlimited patience of the other EMS members in order to avoid devaluation.
Finally, the sanction of devaluation will be unavoidable. The danger of moral
hazard effects has thus been reduced. This is beneficial for both the discipli-
ning effects of EMS membership and for the dissipation ofthe above me~tio­
ned Western fears. With clear sanctions the likelihood of an inflationary
impact of hi~h inflation countries on the other members has clearly been
further limited.
4.4. Conditions for an EMS Membership
In principle, the EMS in its present shape seems suitable to integrate Central Euro-
pean currencies and to assist them in their further attempts to reduce inflation rates.
21Such an integration could be an element of a monetary strategy of catching up with
the West - even long before a full membership of these countries in the EU can be
realized. However, the preceding considerations hint on certain minimum re4uire-
ments that should be fulfilled.
Most important, the central bank of a potential EMS member must in princi-
ple be able to control the monetary aggregate. That means that the early stage of
transition in which soft budget constraints playa dominant role must have been
overcome. Only in that case the attempt to import monetary credibility from the
EMS has a chance to be successful. The central banks rnust be independent from
politics. Public deficits must be limited to a size that can be financed on capital
markets in order to make central bank independence credible.
The inflation rate should be near the single digit region. A higher rate would
make EMS membership pointless since regular devaluations of the high inflation
currency were unavoidable. An inflation rate requirement "near ten per cent" may
seem lax from the Western point of view. However. the advantage of EMS mem-
bership is the idea of breaking inflationary expectations. There is no point in waiting
until this has been achieved outside the EMS. Apart from that. high inflation rates
Wl~re not unusual among the EMS members when the system came into existence in
1979 (Denmark, France, Italy and Ireland had inflation rates above ten per cent in
1979).
Judging from these preconditions the time already seems to be ripe for a
Czech membership in the EMS (see tables I and 2). The inflation rate is expected
to be about II per cent in 1994. The good budgetary situation allows the central
bank the effective control of monetary policy. In Hungary and the Slovak Republic,
inflation rates are coming near to the point that would make an EMS membership
possible. However, further progress in reducing public deficits seems necessary in
these countries. In Poland, an EMS membership is not recommendable before a
further reduction in inflation can be achieved.
4.5. After an EMS entry
If the preconditions are fulfilled, the refornl countries should be allowed to enter the
EMS at unanimously agreed central rates and wide fluctuation margins of+/- 15 per
cent. After an EMS entry, it would be in the responsibility of the governments in
Central Europe to use the EMS membership to reduce inflationary expectations. For
22that purpose, the governments had publicly to commit themselves to steer the
exchange rate near the central rate and to stick to a policy of "Crown Fort", "Zloty
Fort" or "Forint Fort". A public commitment would raise the political costs of
devaluation. The commitment would be more credible than outside the EMS because
of the presence of the EMS intervention mechanisms.
On political grounds, even a soft perfomance in the first time of EMS mem-
bership (i.e. some develuating realignments) might be better than outside the EMS.
The Central European Countries would have entered an important institution of the
European Union. Western public and politicians would get used to the idea of
Central European membership in Western instituti0I"ls.
The start of monetary union according to the Maastricht schedule would not
pose any problems. Realistically, this new era is not to be expected before 1999.
Not all present EU member states will qualify for a participation from the begin-
n-ing. The EMS will have to be continued besides the area of a single currency. As
such it will be the transition space for those currencies that still have to prove their
qualification for monetary union. Probably, the Visegnid currencies would not be
alone in that monetary space at least for a couple of years.
5. A Stabilization Fund
The cyclical distance between West and Central Europe is not an obstacle to mone-
tary unification if other adjustment instruments exist that are working quickly and
efficiently enough. One of this alternative adjustment instruments is a high degree
of fiscal integration (see section 3.1.). In a fiscally integrated area, a region expe-
riencing a recessionary asymmetric shock benefits from a stabilizing inflow offunds
via the fiscal system. Within national states, this mechanism works by an increase
of transfers into the depressed region (unemployment insurance, fiscal equalization
payments) and a decrease of tax payments out ofthe depressed region. An indicator
of regional shock absorption can be defined in the following way (Pisany-Ferry et
aI., 1993):
(1) S = J - dRD1/dY
23RDI is regional disposable income and defined as:
(2) RDI = Y - TAXo + TRo
Y denotes the regional GDP, TAXo the tax payments flowing out of the region and
TRo the transfer payments flowing into the region from outwards. S is zero without
any fiscal integration and one if the shock is completely absorbed without reducing
regional disposable income. Pisani-Ferry et al. (1993) estimate S of national fiscal
systems to be 17,1 per cent in the USA, between 33,5 and 42 per cent in Germany
and 37,4 per cent in France.
From the evidence of existing national monetary unions, it could be argued
that the European Monetary Union should be accompanied by a similar degree of
fiscal integration. This would be particular helpful for those countries whose cylical
performance is not yet parallel to the European core.
In that perspective, the reluctance of the present EU member states to give
Central European countries the same access to the structural funding of the Commu-
nity as for example the Souther European countries poses not alone a political but
also a macroeconomic problem. The EU budget could play a stabilizing role and
thus serve as an adjustment instrument for asymmetric shocks that would make a
comprehensive monetary union more manageable.'
In a recent paper, Italianer and Vanheukelen (1993) have calculated that a
fund that is constructed specifically for the purpose of stabilization could work
efficiently with very limited resources. For the EU, a degree of stabilization similar
to that observed in the USA could be reached at annual costs of only 0.2 per cent
of GDP. This efficiency is possible with a high elasticity of such a fund, as can be
demonstrated by a transformation of equation (1):
(3) S = dTAXoldY - dTRoidY = ETAX * (TAXoIY) - ETR * (TRolY)
ETAX and ETR denote the tax-elasticity and the transfer-elasticity of regional,GDP
respectively. The elasticity depiction of S shows that a high degree of stabilization
1In any case, this role could only be limited because of the size of the
European budget. With 1.2 per cent of EU-GDP this budget has a much lower
macroeconomic significance than the central budgets within the national econo-
mies.
24can be realized either by a high volume of interregional flows (high tax-income or
transfer-income ratios) or a high elasticity of these flows with respect to income. In
the national states the former way is used and the large macroeconomic weight of
central budget produces regional stabilization as a by-product. For stabilization in
the European Monetary Union the latter way can help to solve the stabilization
problem in the presence of a small central budget.
While this idea seems to be a sensible approach for the EU as a whole, it
could particularly well serve the fiscal integration of the Central European countries
during the period in which these countries do not yet get access to full structural
funding, either because they are not yet EU members or - after an EU entry - they
are treated differentially. With the help of a stabilization fund the macroeconomic
problems of a denied access to structural funds could be solved.
The major political advantages stem from~the low costs ofan efficient Central
European stabilization fund. In 1991 the GOP of Visegnid countries amounted to
about two per cent of EU-12-GDP. Even with higher growth rates in the coming
years, the ratio will grow only slowly. From a stabilization fund money would flow
into a country only if this country experiences a growth rate below the European
average. The volume of transfers into the country affected by a negative shock
measured in terms of national GOP percentage points would not need to exceed the
growth differential between that country and the European average. For example,
with a growth in the Visegnid countries three per cent below the European average,
transfers of 0.06 per cent of EU-12-GDP (2 per cent EU-12-GOP x 3 per cent
growth differential) would completely neutralise that asymmetric disturbance.
2 For
a stabilization effect of a size comparable to that from the German fiscal system, 40
per cent of that volume, i.e. 0.024 per cent of EU-12-GDP would be sufficient.
This high stabilizing efficiency ofthe scheme stems from the fact ofa transfer
elasticity approaching infinity when income growth falls below European average.
In times of a parallel cycle or a cycle more favourable in Central Europe there
would not be any payments out of the fund.
The setting up of a stabilization fund benefitting the Central European coun-
tries could be imagined to parallel their EMS entry. This would help to create
credibility of the EMS exchange-rate-peg. Market participants would not any longer
2This is a cautious calculation since an asymmetric shock affecting specifi-
cally the Visegnid countries is rather unlikely given the cyclical analysis from
section 3. '
25expect difficulties from cyclical asymmetries for the stability of the exchange rate.
In this respect, a stabilization fund is to be recommended in particular for the
transition period until the real integration between Central and Western Europe has
further proceeded.
6. Summary
Since the Maastrich Treaty has been signed the aims ofEuropean integration include
the introduction of a single European currency. Therefore, in an EU membership
strategy the monetary perspective has gained importance. A country willing to
qualify for ED membership has to prove its ability to participate in the monetary
union at least after a transition period.
Obstacles to a monetary integration of Central Europe are presently the
inflation rates that are still significantly above Western European levels and the
incomplete real integration as measured by the degree of cyclical correlation.
The cyclical analysis does not justify a recommendation for a regional ex-
change-rate strategy. Instead of that, an early EMS membership is proposed to
support the process ofinflation reduction in the Visegnid countries. The EMS crisis
of 1992/93 has improved the ability of the system for a short-tenn entry of the
Central European currencies. This is due to a less ambitious view of the EMS that
is not longer seen as a de facto monetary union.
A stabilization fund ofa very limited financial volume could help to assist the
monetary integration strategy until the growing trade relations and the completion
ofeconomic restructuring lead to a more parallel cyclical situation. That fund would
be particular helpful since it is politically improbable that the Visegnid countries
could soon benefit from the structural funds of the Community.
The proposed strategy seems politically feasible, since the risks and costs for
Western Europe are very limited. At the same time, the outlook for a full members-
hip of Visegnid countries in the European, Union under the Maastricht constitution
would improve considerably.
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28Appendix: Origin and Availability of Data
The following table summarizes the origin and the data availability of indices of
industrial production as they were used in the analysis of section 3.
Country Data Source
Availability
Belgium 72.01 - 93.05 IMF-IFS
Denmark 76.01 - 93.10 IMF-IFS
France 72.01 - 93.10 IMF-IFS
Gennany 72.01 - 93.11 IMF-IFS
Greece 72.01 - 92.12 IMF-IFS
Ireland 82.01 - 91.11 IMF-IFS
Italy 72.01 - 93.10 IMF-IFS
Luxemburg 72.01 - 92.12 IMF-IFS
Netherlands 72.01 - 93.09. IMF-IFS
Portugal 79.01 - 91.09 IMF-IFS
Spain 72.01 - 93.09 IMF-IFS
United 72.01 - 93.09 IMF-IFS
Kingdom
Austria 79.01 - 93.06 IMF-IFS
Finland 72.01 - 93.10 IMF-IFS
Norway 72.01 - 93.11 IMF-IFS
Sweden 72.01 - 93.07 IMF-IFS
Czech Re- 80.01 - 94.01 GECD
public
Hungary 80.01 - 93.12 GECD
Poland 85.0I - 93.11 GECD
Slovak 80.01 - 94.01 GECD
Republic